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Andrea Dworkin on the Biblical Foundations of Violence against Women 
Julie Kelso 
 
The metaphysical ground rules for male and female were set in Genesis, 
in the beginning. The implications have been comprehended deeply and 
honed into laws and practices. The implications go far beyond the letter 
of the law, especially beyond the specific small laws that regulate the 
when and how of intercourse. The implications honor the basic law, 
men’s ownership of women through intercourse. (Dworkin 1987, 
pp.193−4)  
In neo-liberal democratic societies, the last decade or so has seen a resurgence in 
second-wave feminist demands for women’s safety in public spaces, but also 
especially in the private realms.1 Domestic violence is now being described as an 
“epidemic” across the world. According to the 2013 World Health Organisation 
Report, approximately 30 percent of women in the world are affected by intimate 
partner violence. In Australia where I live, on average one woman a week is murdered 
by her intimate partner.2 While there has been a suggestion recently that this revived 
focus on male violence against women is part of a fourth-wave of feminism,3 it is 
important to note that this wave’s demands are remarkably similar to that of the second 
wave of feminism known as “radical feminism.” In particular, in mainstream media we 
have seen the return of the 1970s radical feminist term “rape culture.” One of the most 
infamous and certainly most divisive radical feminist figures of the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s who worked tirelessly, as both a writer and an activist, towards revealing the 
nature of rape culture was the late Andrea Dworkin. In this chapter, my interest is with 
her argument that intercourse itself must be analysed robustly in its context of male-
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dominated and male-supremacist societies, indeed as one of its principal institutions. 
While Dworkin never actually claimed that all intercourse is rape (despite the habitual 
and continued insistence of that thesis in the mainstream media and in cyberspace 
whenever her name is mentioned), she does insist that women’s lives could never be 
valued as properly human—in the existentialist sense of being essential rather than 
inessential lives—without an unflinchingly honest appraisal of intercourse in male 
supremacist societies. In other words, it is not the case that, for Dworkin, intercourse 
has always been and will always be demeaning for women, or that it is ontologically 
the same as rape. Rather, in societies that hold the male of the species as supreme and 
the female as delightfully incidental—a footnote to man’s story or a moon orbiting 
around planet man—when asking why rape culture is able to persist, we must consider 
the role of intercourse itself.  
When we think of the Bible and the issue of violence against women, we tend 
to go straight to those stories and legal texts that are well-known to us from decades of 
feminist work in the discipline. We are familiar with Genesis 34, Num. 31:7−18, 2 
Samuel 13, Jdg. 21:10−24, the laws found in Deuteronomy (21:10; 22:23−9), and the 
gendered language of violence in the prophets, just to name a few. In this essay, 
however, I want to explore Dworkin’s discussions concerning the sodomy laws in 
Leviticus and the story of Adam and Eve in Gen. 2:4b−4:1 with respect to what she 
perceives to be their foundational role in the institutionalization of intercourse. 
Dworkin is interested in the religious and legal discourses that help to create the 
political meaning of intercourse and legitimize what she considers often to be the 
actual and devastating violence of the act for the woman in male supremacist societies: 
the erosion of the self and the compliant acceptance of lower status. I shall first explore 
her arguments concerning intercourse before moving to a discussion of her readings of 
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the biblical texts. In what follows, I carefully seek to understand Dworkin’s arguments 
in the context of the book (Intercourse) as a whole. Dworkin has been (naively) either 
demonized or hagiographized in the media and in the Academy, and both sides pick 
and choose passages from her work without attending to their immediate ideational 
context and thus without giving her the critical attention I believe her ideas deserve.4   
 
The Institution of Intercourse 
In her notorious book Intercourse (1987), Andrea Dworkin claims that women’s 
second-class status is possibly attributable to the socially-constructed definition of our 
bodies as lacking in physical integrity during intercourse. In male supremacist societies 
like ours, “Woman” is constructed as that which is entered, penetrated, occupied, and 
denied privacy, and naturally so (Dworkin 1987, pp.144−6). As a strictly materialist 
analysis of intercourse, Dworkin’s focus is on intercourse as an institutional practice 
distinct from intercourse as an unmediated individual experience (as if possible). As 
Jenefsky with Russo (1998) helpfully point out, this is akin to Adrienne Rich’s now 
classic analysis of motherhood as an institution rather than any individual experience 
of motherhood (Rich 1976; Jenefsky with Russo 1998, p.99). As such, Dworkin’s 
focus is on those discourses (literary, philosophical, religious, legal) that have 
effectively constructed the political meaning of intercourse in male-dominated 
societies. Her analysis concerns the broader and complicated relations of power within 
which the act takes place and which have historically made the subjugation of women 
through the act somewhat mandatory for their existence. For so long now and, 
Dworkin maintains, across all cultures, woman “is defined by how she is made, that 
hole, which is synonymous with entry” (1987, p.145). Dworkin points out that no other 
oppressed people are cast as “being made for intercourse: for penetration, entry, 
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occupation” (ibid.). We cannot analogize this situation with colonial occupation, or 
racism, or the oppression and abuse of children, or the Gulag, for example, because, 
according to Dworkin:  
There is nothing that happens to any other civilly inferior people that is 
the same in its meaning and in its effect even when those people are 
forced into sexual availability, heterosexual or homosexual; while subject 
people, for instance, may be forced to have intercourse with those who 
dominate them, the God who does not exist5 did not make human 
existence, broadly speaking, dependent on their compliance. (1987, 
pp.145−6) 
It is this socially and religiously constructed determination of intercourse as “a means 
or the means of physiologically making a woman inferior” that underwrites all 
violence against women, indeed what naturalises it, according to Dworkin. And 
foundational to all of this, at least in the Judeo-Christian traditions, is “the 
metaphysical laws of dominance articulated in Genesis” (Dworkin 1987, p.195).  
For Dworkin, feminist thought in particular has more often than not been 
marked by a refusal to confront the political meaning of intercourse. This refusal marks 
not only conservative thinking, but liberalism and radicalism as well. She states: 
Intercourse is fun, not oppression. Intercourse is pleasure, not an 
expression or confirmation of a state of being that is either ontological or 
social. Intercourse is because the God who does not exist made it; he did 
it right, not wrong; and he does not hate women even if women hate him. 
Liberals refuse categorically to inquire into even a possibility that there is 
a relationship between intercourse per se and the low status of women. 
Conservatives use what appears to be God’s work to justify a social and 
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moral hierarchy in which women are lesser than men. Radicalism on the 
meaning of intercourse—its political meaning to women, its impact on 
our very being itself—is tragedy or suicide … What intercourse is for 
women and what it does to women’s identity, privacy, self-respect, self-
determination, and integrity are forbidden questions; and yet how can a 
radical or any woman who wants freedom not ask precisely these 
questions? The quality of the sensation or the need for a man or the desire 
for love: these are not answers to questions of freedom; they are 
diversions into complicity and ignorance. (1987, p.147)  
It is necessary to point out that Dworkin’s thinking is heavily influenced by the 
existentialism of Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre. She is particularly 
committed to the Sartrean and Beauvoirean ideal of freedom as autonomous living, 
where subjects are free to pursue their transcendence, forging projects of their own, but 
only on the condition of the freedom of others. Like Beauvoir (2011) before her, 
Dworkin maintains that this pursuit is more difficult for women, if even possible at all, 
because of their prescribed function as inessential “other” for men.  
Dworkin thus rejects the 1960s and 1970s radical libertine mandate that sex is 
freedom, considering it yet another means whereby men get women to accept their 
lower status. With libertinism, thinks Dworkin, women do not experience their own 
sexual liberation, despite what they might think is the case; instead they are merely 
agreeing to give men what they want and in greater quantities. In Right-Wing Women 
(1983), Dworkin points out that in the late 1960s, prior to the rise of radicalized 
feminism in the US, the men of the counter-cultural New Left “agitated for and fought 
for and argued for and even organized for and even provided political and economic 
resources for abortion rights for women,” because if abortion were not available to 
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women on demand, then “fucking would not be available to men on demand” (p.95). 
With the rise of feminist consciousness came the demise of the men of the New Left’s 
concern for women’s abortion rights, as women began to see how they had been used 
as sexual objects: “The leftist men turned from political activism: without the easy lay, 
they were not prepared to engage in radical politics” (pp.97−8). 6 
Writing about Flaubert’s Emma Bovary, Dworkin declares that with Emma the 
modern era begins, an era she describes as “the petite bourgeoisie seeking freedom” 
(1987, p.125). Emma’s supposed liberation does not come about through increased 
education or economic reform, but through sex. Dworkin states with respect to 
Flaubert’s novel: “Female freedom is defined strictly in terms of committing forbidden 
sexual acts. Female heroism is in getting fucked and wanting it” (ibid.). For Dworkin, 
the so-called sexual liberation movement of the 1960s and 1970s crystallises this 
delusion—that sex is freedom—of the modern era (p.169). 
In her analyses of cultural products from pornography to high literature, 
Dworkin concludes that sexual intercourse currently cannot take place without the 
objectification of the woman. She wonders what intercourse could be like without 
objectification, whether it is even possible in societies drenched in the ideology of 
male power and dominance (Dworkin 1987, p.166). Clearly, Dworkin’s analysis of an 
act that for many heterosexual women is not (always, or perhaps even often) 
unpleasant or overtly subjugating is confronting to say the least. And, I presume, many 
heterosexual men resent being told they are violators of women. It is well-known that 
Dworkin was and largely still is dismissed as “anti-sex” or “sex-negative” by her 
theoretical adversaries, male and female. This typecast dismissal harkens back to 
reactions to Dworkin’s earlier book Pornography: Men Possessing Women (1989; first 
published in 1981), and her allegiance with the feminist lawyer Catherine MacKinnon, 
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but then set in stone after the publication of Intercourse. Dworkin has indeed come to 
be understood as a thinker who rejects entirely what is known as heterosex in the West: 
intercourse.  However, for Dworkin, the term “sex-negative” is “the current secular 
reductio ad absurdum used to dismiss or discredit ideas, particularly political critiques, 
that might lead to detumescence” (1987, p.57).  
Intercourse, Dworkin argues, is understood as a sacred act by both the moral 
Right and the progressive Left, and as such cannot in itself be criticized. “Fucking” is a 
good thing, and this good thing is powerfully related to the idea of citizenship in 
“Amerika”: 
In Amerika, there is nearly this universal conviction—or so it appears—
that sex (fucking) is good and that liking it is right: morally right; a sign 
of human health; nearly a standard for citizenship. Even those who 
believe in original sin and have a theology of hellfire and damnation 
express this Amerikan creed, an optimism that glows in the dark: sex is 
good, healthy, wholesome, pleasant, fun; we like it, we enjoy it, we want 
it, we are cheerful about it; it is as simple as we are, the citizens of this 
strange country with no memory and no mind. (1987, p.55) 
To analyse the function of intercourse almost equates to treason. To question the 
function of intercourse, to analyse and scrutinize the act in search of its concealed 
political, cultural, economic, and social service to men, is to render oneself silent in the 
process. Or rather, it is women who must subscribe to this simplistic promotion of 
intercourse (Dworkin 1987, p.56). The fact that Dworkin is today rarely engaged with 
in a substantial manner,7 or that her ideas are rarely taught except as of interest to those 
keen on the history of feminism, is perhaps testimony to the fact that Dworkin was 
right on one count at least: if you, a woman, criticize intercourse you will be silenced. 
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In a sense, this is the main point of Intercourse: men are afforded the ability to describe 
intercourse in all its ambiguities, the good and the bad, while women must simply like 
it.8 We should also remember that Leo Bersani’s (1987) famous sentence “There is a 
big secret about sex: most people don’t like it” also appeared in the same year as 
Intercourse. To my knowledge, Bersani was not dismissed as a “sex-negative” 
thinker.9 
As a consequence, this general prohibition against women criticising 
intercourse has led to gross distortions of Dworkin’s analysis. Dworkin was and still is 
regularly charged with claiming in Intercourse that all intercourse is rape. Even those 
feminist sisters who have insisted on challenging the reduction of sex to intercourse 
find Dworkin too much to bear. This is because for such feminists—those who reject 
essentialistic or biologically determined understandings of male-female sexuality, as 
does Dworkin—Dworkin seems to dismiss all forms of heterosexual intercourse under 
patriarchy because of the physical difference between women and men.  Consider the 
following oft-quoted paragraph: 
This is nihilism; or this is truth. He has to push in past boundaries. There 
is the outline of a body, distinct, separate, its integrity an illusion, a tragic 
deception, because unseen there is a slit between the legs, and he has to 
push into it. There is never a real privacy of the body that can coexist 
with intercourse: with being entered. The vagina itself is muscled and the 
muscles have to be pushed apart. The thrusting is persistent invasion. She 
is opened up, split down the centre. She is occupied—physically, 
internally, in her privacy. (Dworkin 1987, p.143) 
When we consider this passage out of context,10 it seems that Dworkin is quite clearly 
arguing that all intercourse is, if not rape, then an invasion, a violence perpetrated 
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against the woman. Not only is this invasion physically violent, with muscles being 
pushed apart, but it is psychologically violent because a woman’s sense of privacy 
(admittedly a modern conception of the individual) is negated through the act. Passages 
such as this one have led certain scholars to view Dworkin as a radically separatist 
feminist who insists that women refrain from intercourse with men because it has been, 
is, and will always be an undermining, indeed destruction, of a woman’s ability to exist 
as a viable, self-determining subject in the world, a human being with integrity. The 
problem for such scholars is one of biological determinism: because of our physical 
differences, men will always control women through the act of intercourse; women 
will always be victims because of their objectification.11 But is this what Dworkin is 
actually saying? 
First of all, Dworkin has always insisted that she never argued that all 
intercourse is rape.12 While not rape (and perhaps here is where the confusion begins), 
Dworkin does think that intercourse is a violent act. For example, in an interview with 
Michael Sheldon she states: “Penetrative intercourse is, by its nature, violent. But I'm 
not saying that sex must be rape. What I think is that sex must not put women in a 
subordinate position. It must be reciprocal and not an act of aggression from a man 
looking only to satisfy himself. That's my point” (2000). Does this mean that, despite 
any agency or intention on the part of the man, no matter his goodness, his kind-
heartedness or his desire for intimacy, by its very nature by having intercourse with a 
woman he is committing violence? It is interesting that Dworkin’s comments about the 
possibilities of intercourse being “communion, a sharing, mutual possession of an 
enormous mystery; it has the intensity and magnificence of violent feeling transformed 
into tenderness” (1987, p.71) are rarely if ever quoted. Such possibilities are 
entertained all throughout Dworkin’s oeuvre, especially the idea that it is a remarkably 
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human accomplishment to transform what she believes (along with Freud and Bataille) 
to be the violent nature of eros into intimacy and tenderness. Yet, such aspects of her 
thinking never seemed to catch on, in the media or in the Academy. In other words, 
Dworkin believes it entirely possibly for human sexuality to be conceived as having 
“the intensity and magnificence of violent feeling transformed into tenderness” (ibid.); 
it is just that we do not live in a world with such a sexual script as the dominant one.    
In the book itself Dworkin’s concern is with the historically dominant depiction 
of intercourse as the occupation and possession of women by men, an act that sustains 
the sexual hierarchicalization of strictly differentiated genders necessary to male 
supremacist societies. Her concern is to de-naturalise all aspects of the act to reveal the 
ideology of male dominance at work, paying close attention to the possessive and 
militaristic language that overwhelmingly is employed to describe intercourse 
(Dworkin 1987, p.73). Thus, while intercourse is not ontologically the same as rape, 
because Dworkin refuses to consider intercourse as isolated from broader discursive 
influence, she asks us to consider the very intrinsic service of intercourse in male 
dominant societies, how these dominant scripts both create and maintain male power 
over women. And it is important to realise that Dworkin is making this argument 
through her critical analyses of predominantly male-authored literature. None of 
Dworkin’s statements about intercourse are based solely on her own experience or 
anecdotal evidence: the book is largely about men and their conceptions and depictions 
of intercourse. 
In the first section of the book, “Intercourse in a Man-made World,” Dworkin 
provides five chapters that are careful and incisive analyses of important works of 
literature by men whom she has described as “phenomenal writers on issues of power 
and freedom” (1992)—notably Leo Tolstoy, Kobe Abe, Tennessee Williams, James 
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Baldwin, and Isaac Bashevis Singer (I will focus only on her reading of Tolstoy, here). 
These chapters starkly reveal for Dworkin the truth of what men in male supremacist 
societies think of intercourse with women and how they are depicted as treating 
women before, during, and after the act.  
Interestingly, Dworkin shows how intercourse, for these men at least, is not 
simple, enjoyable, and unproblematic, as is the banal yet dominant cliché about 
sexuality, especially the young, straight man’s sexuality. For example, Leo Tolstoy’s 
main character in his Kreutzer Sonata is driven by desire to have sex with his wife, 
only to be repulsed by her afterwards. In between their sexual encounters he is either 
cruel to her or he ignores her, until his desire gets the better of him and he wants to 
have sex with her again.13 As Dworkin points out, however, the repulsion felt for the 
wife is not caused by his disgust at her body or some puritan loathing of carnality 
itself. He loathes her because in intercourse her necessary inferiority to him becomes 
apparent. The great social critic of inequality (Tolstoy) believes intercourse must be 
eradicated if men and women are to be equal because intercourse makes exploiters of 
men and slaves of women: 
[T]he enslavement of woman lies simply in the fact that people desire, 
and think it good, to avail themselves of her as a tool of enjoyment. Well, 
and they liberate woman, give her all sorts of rights equal to man, but 
continue to regard her as an instrument of enjoyment, and so educate her 
in childhood and afterwards by public opinion. And there she is, still the 
same and depraved slave, and the man still a depraved slave-owner. They 
emancipate women in universities and in law courts, but continue to 
regard her as an object of enjoyment. Teach her, as she is taught among 
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us, to regard herself as such, and she will always remain an inferior being. 
(Tolstoy 1967, p.385) 
Tolstoy’s protagonist also loathes his wife (and ultimately kills her) because her 
sensuality renders him powerless to her charms, according to him. Because women are 
made to be inferior through their sexual objectification they enact their revenge, says 
Tolstoy, by enslaving men through sex. As Dworkin points out, the logic here is 
somewhat perverse: men are favoured by laws, rights, and privileges and yet they 
perceive themselves to be dominated by women in their revenge against men for their 
lower status. Yet, women can only achieve some perceived level of power by assuming 
their inferior status in intercourse, because otherwise men would not desire them 
(Dworkin 1987, p.19). It is crucial to note that it is Tolstoy who is arguing that 
intercourse reduces women to slavery. While Dworkin insists that intercourse must be 
rigorously analysed for its complicity in the maintenance of men’s domination of 
women, it is Tolstoy who is in fact suggesting its elimination from human behaviour. 
To my knowledge, Tolstoy was never silenced because of this idea, nor deemed “sex 
negative.” Again, it seems that it is only women who must not criticize the act.  
 
Law, Nature, and the (Biblical) Metaphysics of Male Supremacy 
Dworkin’s discussion in Intercourse of Leviticus and Gen. 2:4b−4:1 occurs in Chapter 
Eight, “Law.” This is the first chapter of the third and final section of the book, titled 
“Power, Status, Hate.” This final section investigates the means by which intercourse 
has been and still is regulated through civil and religious institutions. Contrary to the 
idea that intercourse is simply a matter of choice and an act that takes place in privacy, 
Dworkin argues that the fact that religious and civil laws have always sought to control 
the determination of both legitimate and illegitimate sex is proof that intercourse is a 
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social construct central to the institution of male supremacy (1987, pp.173−4). 
Historically, and until very recently (see below), the only privacy afforded the act 
concerns a man’s right to use his wife for anything and in any way he wants.  
There are three ways that legal restrictions on sexual activity maintain the strict 
gender demarcation requisite if domination of one over the other can occur. First there 
are those laws that insist that a man only have sex with someone not like him, that is, 
someone with a vagina and a womb. Dworkin quotes Norman Mailer, whom she 
describes as combining the best of both Proust and Leviticus when he writes: 
Yes, it is the irony of prison life that it is a world where everything is 
homosexual and yet nowhere is the condition of being a female male 
more despised. It is because one is used, one is a woman without the 
power to be female, one is fucked without a womb. (Mailer, quoted in 
Dworkin 1987, 181) 
Women are useful because of their capacity to reproduce for men. Indeed, argues 
Dworkin, in both Proust and Mailer the “real man” as opposed to the “female man” is 
affirmed by women’s ability to reproduce, “with the whole meaning of the fuck—
gender—being resolved by its outcome in producing children. Sensual pleasure is not 
what distinguishes homosexual sodomy from heterosexual fucking: the woman bearing 
the child does—in religion, in Mailer” (Dworkin 1987, p.182). Sodomy laws are thus 
obviously related to those laws that regulate what exactly a man can do to a woman, 
when and why (p.184).  
The second form of regulation concerns laws that prevent men from being 
treated like women, that is, penetrated. These are the biblical sodomy laws themselves. 
Dworkin argues that all laws concerning sexuality, especially the sodomy laws 
deriving from Leviticus (“Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind; it is an 
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abomination,” 18:22; “And if a man lie with mankind, as with womankind, both of 
them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their blood 
shall be upon them,” 20:13)14 along with the cross-dressing law in Deut. 22:5 (“A 
woman shall not wear that which pertaineth unto a man, neither shall a man put on a 
woman’s garment; for whosoever doeth these things is an abomination unto the Lord 
thy God”), are there to maintain a strict demarcation of gender, so that the 
heteronormative hierarchy of man over woman can be maintained. When gender is 
blurred, particularly in sexual acts, male supremacy as a system of power becomes less 
potent.  
Dworkin is particularly interested in sodomy laws and how their true purpose, 
according to her, is to maintain man’s civil and sexual superiority over women through 
the controlling of the lust of men. The logic is that if men as a class are dominant, each 
male feels it his right to dominate another, anyone he might choose. However, if he 
starts to dominate another man instead of a woman, then these men have to endure 
what women are there for in the service of male supremacy, and “naturally” so. 
Dworkin begins her discussion with Augustine’s association of lust with dominance. 
Before the fall, thinks Augustine, man and woman had sex without lust: “a man and his 
wife could play their active and passive roles in the drama of conception without the 
lecherous promptings of lust, with perfect serenity of soul and with no sense of 
disintegration between body and soul” (Augustine 1958, p.318). In Eden, before the 
fall, we see the dichotomized gender positions as active and passive, even without lust. 
Sodomy, according to Augustine, is a sin against nature, male nature at least, as created 
by his God, and thus a crime against his God. As Dworkin points out, despite the 
centuries between them, both Mailer and Augustine are remarkably similar in their 
descriptions of the lust of dominance as:  
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an ecstasy, a frenzy, cruelty, all-encompassing, dominance in the fuck as 
a supreme and superb pleasure. Men are not supposed to have to endure 
being the victims of this lust; perhaps there is an implicit recognition that 
the subordination itself, the carnal experience of it, would change them, 
their so-called nature—create in them the incompleteness, the low self-
esteem, so commonplace in women under male dominance. (1987, p.183) 
Sodomy laws are there to protect men as a class from the degradation of being made 
woman-like. In the Judeo-Christian traditions, sodomy is understood as an 
abomination, a violation of male nature such that it presents “a nightmare vision of one 
kind of sexual equality: men used by men as women are in sex to satisfy the lust for 
dominance expressed in the fuck” (Dworkin 1987, p.183). 
Relatedly, the third category concerns those laws that maintain male control 
over their women, adultery laws and rape laws especially. The issue for Dworkin, with 
respect to these laws, is one of restraint. While it is obvious that the controlling of 
women’s and men’s sexual activities is an integral part of social organization, what 
Dworkin argues is that the morality often behind these laws is also, as she puts it, 
“brilliantly pragmatic. Male dominance does best, after all, when men do not, generally 
speaking, fuck themselves to death by fucking whatever moves. Restraint is a key to 
power” (Dworkin 1987, p.186). Men must not fuck other men’s women because this 
depletes the power of men as a class by causing conflict between them (p.190). 
For Dworkin, the legitimation of rape in marriage, which she worries now 
extends beyond marriage to include the rights unmarried men have over unmarried 
women, derives in our culture at least not just from the biblical laws concerning 
legitimate and illegitimate sexual practices but from the story of the first man and 
woman in Gen. 2:4b−4:1, where she claims that “the metaphysical ground rules for 
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male and female were set” (1987, 193). While in the first version, as we know, there is 
a possible reading of equality between the sexes (“And God created man in His own 
image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them,” Gen. 
1:27), the second creation myth clearly makes woman subservient to man (Genesis 2); 
she is “made for him from him; bone of his bones, flesh of his flesh; and God affirms 
they are ‘one flesh’” (Dworkin 1987, p.191). It is because of this version that, as 
Dworkin puts it, “jurists for centuries after recognized a man and his wife as one flesh: 
the man’s” (ibid.). And the reason for this is that in the second story we get a strict 
separation of humanity into two genders, whereas the first story hints at their sameness.   
In her reading of the story, when Eve eats from the forbidden fruit, her 
“natural” inferiority is manifest, allowing herself to be seduced by a snake. Having 
disobeyed God and seduced Adam into eating the forbidden fruit, it seems that her 
difference from him becomes most apparent: “All of the bone-of-my-bones business 
disappears, in a sense for ever. She and he are ‘one flesh’ in that he has sovereignty 
over her body; but they are different from then on, her bones not reminding one of his 
at all, her flesh so different from his that it might as well have been made out of some 
different material altogether” (Dworkin 1987, p.192).  
Here, Dworkin’s thinking is reminiscent of Simone de Beauvoir’s existentialist 
reading of the biblical first man and woman (2011, pp.164−5). For Beauvoir, the 
second creation story in Genesis, like all creation myths in her view, expresses man’s 
self-servingly necessary conviction that woman is his inessential other. Upon her 
(unorthodox) Hegelian reading, woman is thus:  
the perfect intermediary between nature that is foreign to man and the 
peer who is too identical to him. She pits neither the silence of nature nor 
the hard demand of a reciprocal recognition against him; by a unique 
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privilege she is a consciousness and yet it seems possible to possess her 
in the flesh. Thanks to her, there is a way to escape the inexorable 
dialectic of the master and the slave that springs from the reciprocity of 
freedoms. (Beauvoir 2011, p.164) 
The Genesis myth, for both Beauvoir and Dworkin, reveals how woman is conceived 
by man as a being who, as “a naturally submissive consciousness” (Beauvoir 2011, 
p.165), is able to become the property of man, as “one flesh: the man’s” (Dworkin 
1987, p.191). Both Beauvoir and Dworkin pursue the historical outcomes of this 
“othering” of woman, exploring the effects of this biblically gendered metaphysics of 
dominance on women who are “privileged prey” (Beauvoir 2011, 165). For Dworkin, 
this becomes clear in the Genesis myth if we continue to read beyond the fall. Eve is 
famously cursed with pain in childbirth, desire for her husband, and she is made 
subservient to him (Gen. 3:16). Immediately upon their expulsion, in Gen. 4:1, Adam 
has intercourse with Eve and she bears Cain: “And Adam knew Eve, his woman, and 
she conceived and bore Cain and she said ‘I have gotten/acquired a man from/with 
Yahweh’” (qanîtî ’îsh et yhwh).15 The issue of Eve’s consent is obviously unimportant. 
Furthermore, Adam and Eve do not walk out of paradise and straight into a story 
concerning Adam’s punishment of life-long toil, nor do they emerge from the garden 
and get attacked by snakes; we go straight to intercourse and the issue of man’s 
dominion over woman. So, summarises Dworkin: “Eve’s curse is in the pain of 
childbirth and in feeling desire for her husband; they are her punishments. The rule of 
the husband over the wife is in sexual intercourse; his sovereignty over her is in the 
fuck” (1987, p.192).  
We might claim that Dworkin’s (and Beauvoir’s) sentiments concerning Gen. 
2:4b−4:1 and the Levitical laws are no longer relevant, given the current (prima facie) 
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recognition of women as “humans” with attendant rights. In particular, the idea that a 
man owns his wife seems rather outdated. However, it is quite astonishing to remember 
that for most western countries it was only in the last decades of the twentieth century 
that laws admitting the possibility of raping one’s wife came to be enacted.16 In other 
words, until recently the law in all liberal democracies insisted that woman belonged to 
her husband and part of his ownership concerned his freedom to fuck her whenever he 
wanted, despite her desire. And for Dworkin, “men’s ownership of women through the 
fuck” derives in our biblically-based cultures from the Genesis myth. We might think 
that we have moved well beyond such a patriarchal proprietary model. However, 
research into the recent alarming rises in the number of women in western societies 
who are raped, abused, and murdered by their intimate partners, married or not, 
suggests otherwise. So too does the well-documented form of male on-line aggression 
towards women, in order to silence them, which is overwhelmingly expressed through 
language of extreme sexual violence.17 However, while there currently is much outrage 
from men and women over this rise in violence against women, Dworkin cautions us 
that social outrage might not be as trustworthy or as progressive as we might think. She 
says:  
Social outrage is power protecting itself; it is not morality. There is 
always a tension between the law that protects male power—basic 
fundamentalism, religious or secular—and men’s wanting to break that 
law: exercise the privileges of power for the sake of pleasure … How 
much license can men take without destroying the effectiveness of the 
laws that formally restrain them in order to protect their power as men? ... 
The regulation of men by men in sex for the sake of upholding the power 
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of men as a class is the least recognized, least scrutinized aspect of male 
dominance and law as an institution of social control. (1987, pp.188−90) 
Thus, we might say, just as in the ancient world of the Bible the so-called “rape laws” 
did not recognise the woman as the victim (the victim generally understood to be the 
father or the husband), despite appearance to the contrary, rape laws today are still 
protecting men from a potentially depleted access to resources: women.    
 
Conclusion 
For Dworkin, violence against women, especially domestic abuse and rape, cannot be 
understood or even attended to without a rigorous and uncompromising analysis of the 
meaning of intercourse itself as constructed within societies that hold the man as the 
supreme being; the only one with any real right to self-determination and indeed 
humanity. Now, of course, not all men have the same levels of power in society, and 
Dworkin acknowledges this as such. However, the physical differences between men 
and women are always conceived and experienced within a male-dominant context 
(Dworkin 1987, p.148). 
The question of whether intercourse could express sexual equality is a difficult 
one because, Dworkin says, “How to separate the act of intercourse from the social 
reality of male power is not clear, especially because it is male power that constructs 
both the meaning and the current practice of intercourse as such” (1987, p.150). 
Intercourse is not and has never been a private act. Indeed, Dworkin argues that the 
classic second-wave radical feminist slogan “the personal is political” is ironically in 
principle the logic of patriarchal law itself, where the social rights given to men in 
male supremacist societies are translated to the private sphere, where men (still) hold 
rights of ownership over women. She states: “The principle that ‘the personal is 
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political’ belongs to patriarchal law itself, originating there in a virtual synthesis of 
intimacy and state policy, the private and the public, the penis and the rule of men” 
(p.187). All of the laws around legitimate sexual practices, including those that 
formally restrain men are, according to Dworkin, instituted to protect male supremacy 
itself, both within the home and beyond. And crucial to the maintenance of this 
ideology is the subjugation of women as “owned through the fuck” (p.188).  
Certain reforms are of course necessary to the task of women’s liberation—
economic equity; the election of women to political office; progressive role models for 
girls; emphasis on the physical strength of women’s bodies; effective rape laws and 
strategies to diminish the incidences of violence against women. Moreover, Dworkin 
recognizes that reforms around women’s sexuality have also been necessary—foreplay 
that defers to female sensualities; less verbal assault of women; the eradication of the 
romanticization of rape, to name a few (1987, pp.149−51). However, while these 
reforms might be necessary to the task, they are not in themselves sufficient because 
for Dworkin they do not address the main question: “Is intercourse itself then a basis of 
or a key to women’s continuing social and sexual inequality?” (p.151). 
In other words, Dworkin sees no point in trying to rethink intercourse without 
recognizing its formative function as an institution of male domination and supremacy. 
She recognizes that women and men do experience pleasure in intercourse, but thinks 
it is most likely because we have internalized those binary gendered erotics of male 
dominance and female submission, even if we simply swap roles. We could imagine 
the female body as hospitable, as Irigaray does in her oeuvre, for example, rather than 
as occupied territory.18 Perhaps her body can be conceived of as welcoming the male, 
with enough preparation, such that no violence is intended or experienced. The 
question Dworkin insists on asking, though, is how such a rethinking could dismantle 
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the broader structures of male dominant society, because until such a dismantling 
occurs intercourse will remain in its service as its most brilliantly effective tool 
because of the concealment of its mechanisms in pleasure. What we see from Gen. 
2:4b−4:1 and the Levitical laws concerning sexuality is that this institutionalization of 
intercourse is entrenched at the base of our male-supremacist culture, a base we sadly 
deem sacred. 
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